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The Business Net Receipts Tax:
A Dog That Will Not Hunt
by CHARLES E. McLURE, JR.*

Introduction
The business net receipts tax ("BNRT") is the centerpiece
proposal of the Commission on the 21st Century Economy
("Commission"), which California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
charged with making recommendations for changes in the state's tax
laws that would, inter alia, "establish [a] 21st century tax structure
that fits with [the] state's 21st century economy."' The BNRT, which
is intended to replace revenues from the corporate income tax, most
of the state portion of the general sales tax, and part of the individual2
income tax, is advertised as a form of value-added tax ("VAT").
But, unlike the standard credit-method VAT, the BNRT employs the
subtraction method to calculate value added. In an attempt to
achieve destination-based taxation for multi-state businesses, the
BNRT employs a sales-based apportionment formula, rather than

* Senior Fellow Emeritus, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. This article is
based in part on the author's presentation at the hearings of the California Senate
Revenue and Taxation Committee held in Sacramento, California, on December 9, 2009.
The author acknowledges the useful comments made by Michael McIntyre, Eric Miethke,
Annette Nellen, Walter Hellerstein, Steven Sheffrin, Kirk Stark, John Swain, and George
Zodrow on a previous draft.
1. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY, at iii (2009),
available at http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/reports/documents/Commission-on-the21stCenturyEconomy-FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
It is

worth noting that only nine of the 14 members of the Commission approved the
Commission's report. In his annual State of the State address, delivered on January 6,
2010, Governor Schwarzenegger encouraged the legislature to take up the Commission's
recommendations.
2. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 44-46. Appendix A of the Commission
Report describes the BNRT.
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border tax adjustments ("BTAs"), which, absent a federal VAT,
would be difficult to implement at the subnational level.
The BNRT was immediately attacked by business,3 labor,' public

interest advocates,5 leading academic tax experts,6 and other
observers,7 as well as by several minority members of the
Commission8 and various public officials-including one member of
the State Board of Equalization9 . Eric J. Miethke notes that "the

Commission's record is devoid of support for the BNRT," and Steven
M. Sheffrin notes that almost two-thirds of the respondents to a poll
conducted in October 2009 opposed the substitution of the BNRT for
other taxes."' While some attacks focused primarily on the shift in tax

3. CalChamber, CalChamber-Led Coalition Urges Legislature to Address Questions
on Net Receipts Tax, (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://www.calchamber.com/headlines/
pages/calchamberledcoalitionurgeslegislaturetoaddressquestionsonnetreceiptstax.aspx;
Posting of John Kabateck to Fox & Hounds Daily Blog, available at http://www.foxand
houndsdaily.com/view/fhdblog (Nov. 20, 2009).
4. Among the many statements made by labor advocates opposing the BNRT is
"Statement by California Labor Federation Executive Secretary-Treasurer Art Pulaski on
Release of Commission on the 21st Century Economy Tax Recommendations," released
September 29, 2009, [hereinafter Pulaski Statement] available at http://www.calaborfed.
org/newsroom/2009_press releases/tax commissionstatement_092909.pdf.
5. See, e.g., JEAN ROSS, CALIFORNIA BUDGET PROJECT FATALLY FLAWED: WHAT
WOULD THE COMMISSION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY'S RECOMMENDATIONS
MEAN FOR CALIFORNIA? (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2009/

091007_FatallyFlawed.pdf.
6. See Letter from Joseph Bankman et al. to Gerald Parsky (Sept. 5, 2009), available
at http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/correspondence/public/ (follow "September 5, 2009:
Correspondence from Kirk Stark, Professorof Law, UCLA School of Law" hyperlink).
7. See Eric J. Miethke, Is California Ready for a Business Net Receipts Tax?, 54
STATE TAX NOTES [121, 867-77 (Dec. 21, 2009); Correspondence-Public Comments,
http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/correspondence/public/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
8. Letter from Richard D. Pomp, Commissioner, Commission on the 21st Century
Economy, to the Commission on the 21st Century Economy (Sept. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/correspondence/staff and-commissioners/
(follow
"September 25, 2009: Correspondence from Richard Pomp, Commissioner, to COTCE
Commission RE: My Vote - Dissenting Report" hyperlink) [hereinafter Pomp Statement];
Letter from Fred Keeley, Commissioner, Commission on the 21st Century Economy, to
Darrell Steinberg, Speaker Pro Tempore, California State Senate (2009), available at
http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/committee/c2l/Publications/2009/Commissioner%20Keele
y%201etter.pdf; and Bill Hauck, Op-Ed., Viewpoints: Revenue Spikes, Not Tax Structure,
Are to Blame, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 12, 2009, at 2E. Hauck is President of the
California Business Roundtable.
9. Michelle Park Steel, Op-Ed., No Time for New, Untested Tax, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER, Oct. 16, 2009, available at http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/tax-215111-statebnrt.html.
10. Miethke, supra note 7, at 870; Steven M. Sheffrin, Tax Reform Commissions in the
Sweep of California Fiscal History, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (forthcoming 2010) (citing
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burdens from upper- to lower-income households that would occur if
the BNRT were substituted for other state taxes, many dealt
specifically with the likely economic effects of the BNRT considered
in isolation.
This paper describes and appraises the BNRT for non-financial
businesses. Section I describes the BNRT. Section II examines
perception problems and opposition to the BNRT by business and
labor groups resulting therefrom. Section III notes the philosophical
inconsistency between the stated objectives of the BNRT and the tax
proposed.
Sections IV through VI explain the defects of the
subtraction method VAT, the effects of sales-based formula
apportionment, and opportunities for tax planning. Sections VII and
VIII explore legal challenges that may arise under the United States
Constitution, federal statutory law, and international trade rules.
Sections IX to XI ask whether any of the defects examined earlier can
be fixed, note the political instability of Michigan's VAT, and suggest
that a better alternative would exist if and when the federal
government adopts a VAT. The conclusion offers the summary
appraisal that the BNRT is a dog-a dog that will not hunt; it should
not be seriously considered, much less adopted.
It is useful to note a few issues this Article does not address, as it
is concerned only with the structure of the BNRT, not the
substitution of that tax for the other taxes named above. First, there
are the relative transparency, familiarity, breadth, volatility,
complexity, compliance and administrative burdens, economic
neutrality, revenue yield, and progressivity of the BNRT and the
taxes it would replace." The Article also does not discuss the

State ConstitutionalReform and Related Issues, CALIFORNIA POLL INDEX (The Field Poll,

San Francisco, California), Oct. 2009, available at http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/
subscribers/COI-09-October-CA-Constitution-Reform.pdf).
11. Many of these issues are addressed in Miethke, supra note 7, and Alternatives to
the Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the 21st Century Economy: Hearing
Before the California State Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation (Jan. 13, 2010)
(testimony of Annette Nellen) [hereinafter Nellen Testimony]. See also Bankman et al.,
supra note 6; Academic Perspectives on the Tax Recommendations of the Commission on
the 21st Century Economy: Hearing Before the California State Assembly Committee on
Revenue and Taxation (Oct. 14, 2009) (testimony of Steven M. Sheffrin) ) [hereinafter
Sheffrin Testimony]; Academic Perspectives on the Tax Recommendations of the
Commission on the 21st Century Economy: Hearing Before the California State Assembly
Committee on Revenue and Taxation (Oct. 14, 2009) (testimony of Kirk J. Stark)
[hereinafter Stark Testimony]; Pomp Statement, supra note 8; and Letter from Richard D.
Pomp, Commissioner, Commission on the 21st Century Economy, to the Commission on
the 21st Century Economy (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/
correspondence/staff andcommissioners/ (follow "September 14, 2009: Correspondence
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desirability of recommended changes in the personal income tax (e.g.,
eliminating the deduction for medical expenses and the child-care
credit), or the apparent inequity and non-neutrality of eliminating the
corporate income tax but not the individual income tax on business
income.'2 Worth special mention is the ill-conceived idea of leaving
intact the local retail sales tax ("RST"), which suffers from at least
two faults. First, the state would continue to determine the base of
the RST and administer that tax on behalf of local governments,
although it would have no direct financial stake in the outcome of its
legislative and administrative efforts. Second, keeping the local RST,
while adding the BNRT, would increase compliance and
administrative burdens. 3
I. The BNRT
The Basic Calculations.

For a business operating only in

California, the tax base and tax liability would be calculated as
follows:
Gross Receipts - Purchases from Other Firms = Net Receipts
Net Receipts x BNRT Rate = BNRT Liability
Gross receipts would be comprised essentially of sales of goods
and services.
Deductible purchases would exclude employee
compensation and (in the case of the non-financial businesses
examined here) interest payments.14 Negative net receipts could be
carried forward for up to five years. 5 The Commission recommended
that the tax rate be no more than four percent, which it stated would
be sufficient to replace revenues from the corporate income tax, most

from Richard Pomp, Commissioner, to COTCE Commission RE: Why I Think We Are
Heading In The Wrong Direction" hyperlink) [hereinafter Pomp, Wrong Direction]. On
the question of volatility, see Legislative Analyst's Office Analysis of COTCE Revenue
Proposals (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/Econ/2010/
COTCE01_1310.pdf (report accompanying testimony of Paul Warren).
12. But see Miethke, supra note 7.
13. See Miethke, supra note 7; Nellen Testimony, supra note 11; Sheffrin, supra note 10.
14. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at A-4 to A-5. Much of the description that
follows is taken from the Commission Report, some of it word-for-word. In a few cases,
what seem to be inadvertent errors in describing the BNRT have been corrected.
Quotation marks are omitted.
15. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at A-9.
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of the state portion of the general sales tax, and part of the individual
income tax. 6
Coverage. The BNRT would apply to all forms of business
entities considered to be "doing business" in California, including
corporations, pass-through entities, and sole proprietorships. There
would be a small business filing threshold of $500,000 in gross
receipts, and a tax credit would effectively exempt net receipts of
$250,000 or less from the BNRT. In combination, the filing threshold
and the tax credit would create what below is called a "small business
exemption. ' ' 17 The tax would be paid quarterly, based on estimated
liabilities.
Nexus. A business entity would be deemed to be doing business
in California if any of the following conditions hold: (1) The business
is organized or commercially domiciled in California; (2) Sales of the
business in California exceed the lesser of $500,000 or twenty-five
percent of a taxpayer's total sales; (3) The real property and tangible
personal property of the business in California exceed the lesser of
$50,000 or twenty-five percent of a taxpayer's total real property or
tangible personal property; or (4) The amount paid in California by
the entity to employees for compensation exceeds the lesser of
$50,000 or twenty-five percent of the total compensation paid by the
taxpayer. 9

16. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 44. The Legislative Analyst's Office has
since estimated, based on 2007 income tax data, that a four percent BNRT would yield
about twenty percent less revenue than required to achieve revenue-neutrality. See
Legislative Analyst's Office, supra note 11, at 1. This implies that a tax rate of about five
percent would be required for revenue-neutrality. An even higher rate would be required
to replace revenues from the other taxes during the earlier part of the decade. See
Sheifrin Testimony, supra note 11; Sheffrin, supra note 10; Stark Testimony, supra note 11
(These commentators argue that the Commission's view that a sizeable fraction of the
burden of the BNRT would be shifted to the federal government, is flawed. The
Commission's reasoning is that revenues from the BNRT, which business taxpayers can
deduct as an expense, would replace revenues from the RST, which many individual
taxpayers do not deduct in calculating their income tax liability. Sheffrin and Stark note
that the deduction for the BNRT merely offsets inclusion of the BNRT in gross receipts.).
17. The small business exemption would be phased-out, based on a graduated
schedule. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at A-6. The Commission Report does
not specify the mechanics of either the credit or its phase-out. Section 27801 of the draft
legislation appended to the Commission Report specifies the calculation of the credit.
Commissioner Richard Pomp has indicated that the Commission did not approve--or
even discuss-the legislative draft. See Pomp Statement, supra note 8, at 5.
18.
19.

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at A-5.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at A-5.
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This definition of "doing business" is consistent with that
effective January 1, 2011, for the California corporate income tax.2'
Unitary Method. The unitary method would apply to both single

entities and to groups of affiliated entities that operate a unitary
business inside and outside of California. 2' Business entities and
affiliated entities could operate one or more unitary businesses, each
of which would pay tax separately. All types of business entities
would be included in the unitary group, including pass-through
entities and sole proprietorships.22
Combination. The business net receipts of a unitary group would

be the sum of the net receipts of the entities included in the unitary
group. Transactions between members of the unitary group would be
eliminated, as under the present corporate income tax. 21
Water's Edge. A unitary group would file on a water's-edge

basis. The definition of a water's-edge group would be similar to that
in current law for corporate income tax purposes. Thus, affiliated
entities organized in the U.S. would be considered inside the water's
edge, while entities organized outside of the U.S., including sub-part

F corporations, generally would not be, except to the extent of their
U.S. activities. Entities with activities in tax haven jurisdictions would
include these activities in the water's edge return.24
Apportionment. The combined aggregate business net receipts

of a unitary group (or a single entity) with multi-state operations
would be apportioned using a single-factor sales formula. 2, For
purposes of calculating the sales factor, the numerator would consist
of sales in California and the denominator would be sales

20. Id. See CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 23101 (2004).
21. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at A-6. Whereas the Commission Report
refers to "single businesses" and groups of "affiliated business," it seems preferable to
refer to "single entities" and groups of "affiliated entities," as in the text. The
Commission Report includes the qualifying words "operating inside and outside of
California" only with regard to single entities. It is assumed here that they are also meant
to apply to unitary groups. Presumably, affiliated entities that operate a unitary business
entirely within California would also be allowed-and required-to file on a combined
basis, as they currently are under the corporate income tax, so that losses from one entity
could be offset against gains of another, even though no "apportionment" issue is raised
by such combined reporting, because the entire tax base is in California.
22. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at A-6.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See equation (3) in Section II.B infra for an algebraic statement of the
apportionment formula. The same formula is available on an elective basis under the
corporate income tax.
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everywhere. If any member of the unitary group has nexus in
California, all in-state sales by any member of the unitary group
would be included in the numerator of the formula (the so-called
FinniganRule). 6
The Definition of Sales. Sales would only include receipts from
the provision of goods and services; they would not include receipts
Occasional sales would also be
from financial transactions.
eliminated from the numerator and the denominator of the
apportionment factor. Both sales of tangible property and sales of
services and intangible property would be attributed to the state of
destination."
Non-business Receipts. Only business receipts-those arising
from the conduct of a trade or business-would be subject to
apportionment. Non-business receipts, such as receipts from passive
investments unrelated to the business, would be allocated to specific
states. California non-business net receipts would be added to the
portion of business net receipts apportioned to California to
determine total net receipts subject to the tax.28
II. Perception Problems
The BNRT is intended to have the effects of a value-added tax,
but it looks, functions, and "feels" like an income tax. As a result,
there is a high probability that business, and perhaps the courts, will
see the BNRT as a peculiar form of income tax-one that allows no
deduction for either labor costs or interest.
A. Will the Real BNRT Please Stand Up?
The BNRT would not be implemented like either the familiar
RST or a standard credit-method VAT. 9 The RST and the standard
VAT are both calculated and applied on a transaction-by-transaction
basis. A California retailer must show the RST as a separate line item
on an invoice, unless the sale is made at a "tax-included price." VAT

26. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at A-7. See Appeal of Finnigan Corporation
(Finnigan I), Cal. St. Bd. of Equal. No. 85A-623-LB (1988); Opinion on Petition for
Rehearing (FinniganII), Cal. St. Bd. of Equal. No. 85A-623-DB (1990).
27. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at A-7.
28. Id. at A-6.
29. See Sijbren Cnossen, A VAT Primerfor Lawyers, Economists, and Accountants,

55 TAX NOTES INT'L 4, 319-32 (Jul. 27, 2009), for an excellent explanation of the basic
structure of the RST and of credit-method, subtraction-method, and addition-method VATs.
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on sales to registered traders must also be shown separately, as credit
can be claimed only for tax shown on invoices.
By comparison, like all subtraction-method VATs, the BNRT
would be calculated by subtracting purchases from gross receipts in a
manner that resembles the calculation of income tax liability. Since it
is not calculated on a transaction-by-transaction basis, it could not be
shown separately.
The BNRT would provide a credit for research and
development, loss carry-forwards, the carry-over of credits and net
operating losses accumulated under the corporate income tax,
allowance for BNRT purposes of depreciation, amortization and
depletion for property acquired before implementation of the BNRT,
and recognition of items deferred under the corporate income tax.'
Loss carry-forwards can reasonably be seen as a surrogate for the
refund of negative liability under a credit-method VAT. The
allowance for BNRT purposes of depreciation, amortization, and
depletion for property acquired before implementation of the BNRT,
and perhaps the carry-over of credits and net operating losses and
recognition of items deferred under the corporate income tax, can be
justified as resembling the type of transition measures employed in
switching from an income tax to a sales taxes. But the research and
development credit is the type of provision found only in income
taxes; it has no place in a sales tax." Moreover, like the income tax,
the BNRT provides for the apportionment of the tax base, based
upon the ratio of California sales to total sales.
But the BNRT is not an income tax-or at best, it is a strange
one. It would not apply to dividends and interest income and would
not allow deductions for wages and salaries or for interest expense,
expenses that are virtually always deductible in calculating taxable
income. Moreover, it would allow immediate expensing of the cost of
additions to inventories and expenditures on amortizable, depletable,
and depreciable assets, treatment that is unusual in an income tax. By
comparison, credit-method VATs normally do allow credits for tax
associated with such expenditures, but do not apply to interest and
dividends.

30. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at A-10.
31. In addition, Miethke, supra note 7, argues that it may not be possible for political
reasons to eliminate many of the other credits found in the income tax.
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B. Taxpayer and Labor Perceptions
How taxpayers and labor perceive the BNRT will condition

whether they accept or oppose this new tax.
The BNRT as a Tax on Labor. Since the BNRT looks like an
income tax that allows no deduction for labor costs, it has been
branded a tax on labor and excoriated by labor leaders and others.32
Their primary complaint is that, because labor expense is nondeductible but purchases of machinery and equipment are expensed
in the year acquired, the BNRT would induce substitution of capital
for labor, thereby reducing jobs in California. That it would induce
outsourcing and misclassification of employees as independent
contractors is a product of the small-business exemption that is not
inherent in the tax.33
This opposition illustrates the importance of perceptions.'
Leaving aside the troublesome treatment of interstate and
international trade and problems associated with the exemption for
small business discussed below, the BNRT is simply a subtractionmethod VAT. As such, it should have roughly the same economic
effects as a conventional credit-method VAT or an ideally designed
RST. Of course, like all consumption-based VATs, the BNRT is a
tax on labor (and profits),35 as well as a tax on consumption.36 But this

32. See, e.g., Kabatech, supra note 3; Pulaski Statement, supra note 4; Ross, supra note 5.
33. See infra Section VI.
34. Michael J. McIntyre & Richard D. Pomp, A Policy Analysis of Michigan's
Mislabeled Gross Receipts Tax, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1275, 1281 (2007) (speculating
regarding the political acceptability of Michigan's new modified gross receipts tax
(MGRT), which bears a close family resemblance to the BNRT, compared to the single
business tax (SBT) that it replaced). "Although the MGRT implicitly includes wages in its
base, that fact is far less obvious than it was under the SBT, which required taxpayers to
explicitly add wages to their income, as computed for Federal tax purposes. As a result of
this change in form, the MGRT is less likely to be chastised for discouraging job creation
in Michigan." Id. Observers in California were quick to realize, however, that the lack of
a deduction for wages in the BNRT, a subtraction-method VAT, is economically
equivalent to taxing wages under an addition-method VAT.
35. The tax would also be a tax on economic profits and, to the extent that it is not
eliminated by transition rules, on the return to old capital.
36. The California Franchise Tax Board ("FrB") has noted that"[f]or taxpayers with
little or no payroll, the BNRT could be viewed as equivalent to a tax on income, whereas
for taxpayers with no income and significant payroll, the BNRT could be viewed as
equivalent to a tax on payroll. Or one could simply view the BNRT as being equivalent to
a tax on the sum of the taxpayer's net income and payroll." The latter is, of course, value
added. THE CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, ANALYSIS OF TAX NEXUS ISSUES
CONCERNING THE COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY'S BUSINESS NET

RECEIPTS TAX PROPOSAL [hereinafter FTB NEXUS REPORT] (Aug.21, 2009), available at
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does not mean that it would induce substitution of capital for labor
anymore than a credit-method VAT or an ideally designed RST
would.37 A basic theorem of the economics of taxation is that a tax on
consumption-and thus a tax on labor-does not affect factor
proportions.m
The BNRT Formula and Taxpayer Perceptions. The formula
used to calculate liability under the BNRT is usually stated as follows:
T = t (G- P)(S/S)
where T is tax liability, t is the tax rate, G is gross receipts, P is
purchases, Sc is California sales, and S is total sales.39 Written this
way, the formula says that the tax base is a fraction of the taxpayer's
total value added, where the fraction is the ratio of the taxpayer's
California sales to its total sales.
But the formula can also be rewritten in the following equally
correct manner:
T= Sct (G- P)/S
Written this way, the tax appears to be levied on the taxpayer's
California sales, at an effective rate that depends on the ratio of the
taxpayer's value added to its total sales, as well as the statutory tax
rate. (By comparison, under a credit-method, unless multiple rates

http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/correspondence/staff and-commissioners/documents/
FTB%20Analysis%20for%20COTCE%20-%208.21.09.pdf.
37. The RST is seldom, if ever, said to cause such substitution. In fact, because extant
RSTs commonly apply to many capital purchases, they may actually induce substitution of
labor for capital.
38. See Cnossen, supra note 29, at 324. Cnossen provides the following heuristic
explanation of the neutrality of a credit-method VAT toward the choice between labor
and capital. Since registered traders are allowed a credit for VAT paid on purchases, the
only tax that ultimately matters is that levied on sales to households. Id. Thus, a creditmethod VAT does not distort the choice of factor proportions. Id. Since credit-method
and subtraction-method VATs are economically equivalent, the latter form of VAT also
does not distort this choice. Id. at 320-22. It is worth noting that, despite some concern
that the credit-method VATs levied in the European Union could cause the substitution
of labor for capital, these taxes are generally seen as taxes on consumption and thus are
generally well-received, despite their regressivity. It should be recognized, however, that
the regressivity of the European VATs is moderated by progressive elements in the rest of
the tax system and by the social services the VATs help finance. The political context in
which the BNRT was proposed (e.g., reducing the progressivity of the income tax) is, of
course, quite different.
39. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 1, at A-7.
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are specified, the effective rate is the same rate on all sales; it is the
statutory rate.) This formulation can be expected to cause those
whose value added represents a high percentage of their sales, such as
those in the professions, but also software companies, to complain
that the tax is unfair. The California Chamber of Commerce, in
testimony before the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee on
behalf of a coalition of business and labor groups has stated,
"[B]usinesses with low profit margins and high employee expenses
presumably would be especially hard-hit as would companies in a loss
position."4
The BNRT and Economic Losses. Taxpayers are accustomed to
being required to collect and remit RST, even when they do not show
a profit. Thus, they would likely accept the responsibility to collect
and remit a conventional credit-method VAT under those
circumstances.
By comparison, they quite rightly expect to be
required to pay income tax only when they have income. But liability
for BNRT does not depend on profitability. Indeed, because labor
costs and interest are not deductible expenses, it could be quite
common for businesses that do not show a profit to be obliged to
remit BNRT. Experience in Michigan suggests that taxpayers may
not understand why they must pay what appears to be an income tax,
even if they have no income, and will resent doing so.41 This is borne
out by opposition to the BNRT expressed by a representative of the
California Chamber of Commerce: "The business net receipts tax
may be imposed on companies even when 42they are losing money and
cannot be passed on as a transactions tax.,
Lessons from Michigan. Experience under Michigan's widely
discredited and recently repealed single business tax ("SBT"), an
addition-method VAT that shares many of the perceived problems
and other defects of the BNRT described here, is instructive.
McIntyre and Pomp have written:
The SBT was rarely seen as a value-added tax by the businesses
collecting it or by the legislators asked to revise it. Instead of
40. CalChamber, supra note 3.
41. See James R. Hines Jr., "State Income, Sales and Consumption Taxes" (Feb. 12,
2009), availableat http://www.cotce.ca.gov/meetings/2009/2-12/testimony/; ROBERT CLINE,
ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS NET RECEIPTS TAX, PRESENTATION TO THE CALIFORNIA
COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY (June 16, 2009), available at.
http://www.cotce.ca.gov/meetings/testimony/documents/Robert-Cline-CA-Tax-Commissi
on_6-16-09.pdf.
42. CalChamber, supra note 3.
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being viewed as a tax collected by business and passed on to
consumers, it was viewed as a peculiar and unfair tax on
business. Although wages are properly included in the base of a
VAT, their inclusion in the base of the SBT was widely
criticized.
Critics claimed that this feature of the tax
discouraged employment. In addition, unlike an income tax,
but like a sales tax, the SBT was collected, sometimes in
substantial amounts, by businesses operating at a loss. Many
businesses felt this result was unfair.
This epitaph for the SBT, co-authored by a member of the
Commission, could have served as prophesy for the Commission
regarding public reception of the BNRT. 4
III. Philosophical Inconsistency
Destination-based VATs are commonly seen as a way of
charging consumers, if only approximately, for the public services
they receive. Underlying this way of thinking is the idea that
household consumption of taxable goods and services is roughly
correlated with the benefits of services provided by government. By
comparison, origin-based VATs can be seen as charging businesses
for the benefits of services they receive.
The Commission seems to confuse the means and ends of benefit
taxation. Its report states, "The BNRT is designed to tax the value a
business adds to its production of products and services in California
and thus attempts to approximate the benefits of services and
programs utilized by the business.""
This statement could be interpreted as describing an attempt to
use the BNRT to levy a benefit-related tax on businesses. Such a tax
would be an origin-based VAT, and, in fact, the first part of the
statement describes an origin-based VAT. But an origin-based tax, if
apportioned, would presumably be apportioned on the basis of
payroll, and perhaps property, rather than sales. Of course, the
Commission did not propose an origin-based tax; it proposed what it

43. McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 34, at 1279.
44. One can only wonder whether a credit-method VAT (if one were feasible) would
have engendered different perceptions and whether opposition would have been as strong
as to the BNRT.
45.

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at A-3.
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sees as a destination-based tax. Thus the design of the tax is logically
inconsistent with the philosophy said to underlie it. 6

IV. Defects of the Subtraction-Method VAT
The conventional credit-method VAT operates in a manner
quite different from the subtraction method underlying the BNRT.47
These operational differences have important economic and political
implications.
Under the credit-method VAT, registered traders collect tax on
non-exempt domestic sales and claim credit for tax paid on purchases
giving rise to non-exempt sales.48 There is thus no multiple taxation
of products passing between registered traders as there is under an
RST that does not exempt all sales to registered traders-the only
kind found in the United States.49
Because of the way the credit-method VAT operates, exemption
of sales to registered traders causes aggregate tax liability to be
higher, not lower, since no credit is allowed for the tax paid on
purchases by the exempt seller. This has an important political
implication: there is an incentive to seek exemptions only for sales to
consumers (and to unregistered traders)."
Incentives-both economic and political-are quite different
under the subtraction-method VAT, which can be said to tax "slices"
of value added-the difference between sales and purchases. Any
value added that is exempt escapes tax."
Besides undermining

46. In a closed economy-one with no trade between jurisdictions-the distinction
between origin- (or production) and destination- (or consumption) based taxation is
meaningless. Of course, as the Commission clearly recognized, it does matter in an open
economy.
47. For a discussion of the mechanics of the VAT, including an elementary discussion
of the disadvantages of the subtraction-method VAT, see CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., THE
VALUE ADDED TAX: KEY TO DEFICIT REDUCTION ch. 6 (1987). For a more complete

discussion of the relative merits of credit- and subtraction-method VATs, see Itai
Grinberg, Where Credit is Due: Advantages of the Credit Invoice Method for a Partial
Replacement VAT, available at http://www.americantaxpolicyinstitute.org/research.html,
63 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), and presented at a conference sponsored by the
American Tax Policy Institute on "Structuring a Federal VAT: Design & Coordination
Issues," Washington, February 18-19, 2009).
48. Sellers making both taxable and exempt sales can claim credit for VAT on
purchased inputs only to the extent they are used to produce taxable (non-exempt) sales.
49. Raymond J. Ring, Jr., Consumers' Share and Producers' Share of the General
Sales Tax, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 79, 81-90 (1999).
50. MCLURE, supra note 47, at 72-74.
51. See id. at 75-76.
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revenues and economic neutrality, this system provides a powerful
incentive to seek exemptions. 2
The use of sales-based formula apportionment in the BNRT
leaves this basic defect intact. The small-business exemption would

create holes in the tax base that would have the effects posited above.
Moreover, one would not be surprised to see the proliferation of

other deductions and credits of the type that are common (if not
appropriate) to income taxes but rare in sales taxes including creditinvoice VATs.
Michigan's experience is also relevant here. Under the Single
Business Tax ("SBT") in effect from 1976 through 2007, Michigan
allowed deductions for a long list of things other than for small
businesses, including contributions to higher education, libraries,
nonprofit organizations, historic restoration, community foundations,
and homeless shelters; child care; summer youth employment;

supplemental workers; apprenticeships and location in Michigan;
activities in enterprise, "brownfield," and renaissance zones;
investment of minority venture capital; and transportation, utility,
agriculture, certain retail, and pharmaceutical companies. 3

The

following appraisal of the SBT, made in 1982, just six years after the
tax was introduced, was even more apt by the time the tax was
"An ideal consumption-type VAT would require all
repealed.
organizations engaged in production to be taxed on their value added

(minus capital expenditures).

An account of the SBT's structural

52. McLure calls a system that allows deductions for all purchases, regardless of
whether or not the vendor has paid tax, a "naive" subtraction-method VAT. A
"sophisticated" VAT would address this problem by allowing deductions only for
purchases that are not exempt. It should be relatively easy to allow deductions only for
purchases from vendors that are subject to the BNRT. Id. at 75-79. See, however, the
discussion of the constitutional problem of doing this in a state tax. Infra note 86 and
accompanying text. Since the subtraction-method is not levied on individual transactions,
as the credit-method tax is, it would be extraordinarily difficult to implement this
modification on a product-by-product basis. Although the Commission's BNRT proposal
does not include product-based exemptions, it would not be surprising to see them appear
over time, either before or after initial introduction of the tax, as occurred in Michigan.
See also Grinberg, supra note 47; David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 599 (2000).
53. See HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, STATE OF MICHIGAN HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, MICHIGAN'S SINGLE BUSINESS TAX (Nov. 2003), available at
http://house.michigan.gov/hfa/archives.asp. Only two retailers qualified for the credit for
retailers and only one, which declined the credit, qualified for the credit for
pharmaceuticals. Id. at 28.
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details is mainly an account of departures from this simple

principle.

"4

The incentives to seek exemptions under the new modified gross
receipts tax ("MGRT"), the subtraction-method VAT introduced in
2008 to replace the SBT (described above) still exist. Regarding the
MGRT, Mclntryre and Pomp observe: "Unfortunately, the new
package has a host of complex special features that can only be
explained by politics running amok."55 This experience offers a clear
warning for California, if ever it should consider adopting the
BNRT-especially since the four percent BNRT rate proposed by the
Commission is five times as high as the MGRT rate.56
V. The Effects of Formula Apportionment
The BNRT has been sold as a destination-based VAT. As
explained in the next paragraph, the credit-method VAT used by
roughly 150 countries employs "border tax adjustments" ("BTAs") to
By
subject imports to VAT and relieve exports of VAT.
comparison, the BNRT employs sales-based formula apportionment
in an attempt to achieve destination-based taxation. But the BNRT
does not necessarily eliminate tax on exports from California, and
even where it does, the effect may not be lower prices for exports.
Under some circumstances the BNRT on imports into the state could
be avoided, as explained in the next section. Even where it is not, it
may not be reflected in the price of imports.
Under the credit-method VAT, imports are taxed, either at the
border or upon their first domestic sale. Exports are zero-rated (not
exempt), and tax paid before the export stage is credited against tax
liability on domestic sales and is refunded, if net liability after credits
is negative. This system-in which BTAs are used to assure that tax

54.

Robin Barlow & Jack S. Connell, Jr., The Single Business Tax, in MICHIGAN'S

FISCAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 679 (Harvey E. Brazer ed., 1982).
55.

McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 34, at 1282.

56. Indeed, a BNRT rate of five percent, which Legislative Analyst's Office suggests
may be needed to achieve revenue neutrality, is more than six times the Michigan rate.
See supra note 11.

57. Cnossen, supra note 29, at 324. The prevalence of the destination principle is so
well-established that authorities such as Cnossen do not even bother to mention it. He
does, however, indicate the difficulty of implementing BTAs under a subtraction-method
VAT. Id. at 322-23.

58. In what follows the terms "exports" and "imports" generally refer to interstate as
well as foreign trade. The discussion of the legality of the BNRT under international trade
rules, refers only to foreign trade. See infra Section VIII.
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is levied where products are consumed, rather than where they are
produced-is commonly called destination-based taxation. BTAs are
generally accurate, in that imports pay the same tax as domestic
products and exports are relieved of tax paid at prior stages of the
production-distribution process, neither more nor less. 9
A. Exports
Sales-based apportionment of net receipts means, in effect, that
no tax is levied directly on out-of-state sales of California taxpayers.
This does not mean, however, that exports are free of the burden of
the BNRT or that formula apportionment would produce the same
result as BTAs, namely lower prices for exports than for in-state sales
of the same product. Two cases deserve examination.
Vertically Integrated Taxpayers. The first case is that in which
exporting taxpayers make no in-state purchases from other firms
subject to the BNRT, which for expositional convenience can be
called vertically integrated taxpayers. In theory, for exports by this
special class of taxpayers, formula apportionment would produce the
same result as BTAs. But theory may not reflect reality.
Where Theory Goes Wrong. If California exporters are not to be
placed at a competitive disadvantage by the BNRT, it is necessary
that they reflect the effects of formula apportionment in the prices of
products-that the price of exports be less than the price of the same
products sold in California by the amount of the BNRT. This almost
certainly will not occur in many cases.
The theoretical result is most likely to prevail where "customized
pricing" is the norm, that is, where the price of a product is tailored to
reflect the attributes of the buyer, including its location; for example,
Boeing's sale of aircraft to foreign buyers. In this case, the purchase
price could be adjusted to reflect the effect of sales-based formula
apportionment in eliminating the BNRT liability related to export
sales. If that occurs, out-of-state buyers would pay less than in-state

59. Because of the effects of the exemptions described earlier, it is difficult to achieve
accurate BTAs under a subtraction-method VAT that includes exemptions. If there are
exempt producers or exempt products, the tax applied to imports and rebated on
purchases used to produce exports should be less than the statutory tax rate. See
MCLURE, supra note 46, at 79-81. Failure to recognize this can trigger complaints under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), the multilateral agreement that
governs international trade discussed in Section VIII. This difference is not relevant for
present purposes, given the use of formula apportionment as a surrogate for BTAs in the
BNRT.
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buyers, and sales-based formula apportionment would produce the
same effects as BTAs.
The theoretical result is unlikely to hold in the case of
"standardized pricing," in which the same price is charged to all
buyers regardless of location, as occurs, for example, in the case of
catalog sales and other sales (including those made to businesses)
based on nationally uniform price lists. Here, even if formula
apportionment were to eliminate the BNRT liability related to export
sales, that elimination would not be reflected fully in the price of
exports; thus, sales-based formula apportionment would not produce
the same results as BTAs. (The exception to this generalization is the
extreme case in which all sales by vertically integrated entities are for
export; in this case, the elimination of the BNRT on exports would
presumably be reflected in export prices. In the more typical case of
mixed in-state and export sales, it would not.)'
It is easy to see why the combination of the subtraction-method
of calculating value-added and sales-only formula apportionment
does not generally produce the same effect as BTAs for exports.
Under the credit-method VAT, tax on individual transactions is
calculated and added to the net-of-tax price of in-state sales, but not
to the price of exports (and tax paid at prior stages is rebated).
Under the subtraction-method calculation that underlies the BNRT,
tax is not calculated on individual transactions and thus cannot be
reflected in the price for in-state sales, but not the price of exports.
As Miethke observes, "There is no mechanism for 'backing out' the
tax, or selling in a two-tier pricing system (one price for in-state sales,
one for out-of-state sales)."61 While sales-only apportionment has the
effect of reducing tax liability to the extent that an entity exports (and
perhaps enabling lower prices for both exports and in-state sales), it
does not guarantee that the lower liability will be reflected in
differences in the prices of in-state sales and of exports.
Unintegrated Taxpayers.
Under the apportionment-based
BNRT, the situation is worse than just described for taxpayers in a
supply chain that is not vertically integrated through the export stage.
In this case, while tax related directly to export sales would be
eliminated by formula apportionment, there would be no rebate of

60. Elimination of BNRT liability related to export sales would allow the standard
price to be lower than otherwise. But that lower price would be applied to in-state sales,
as well as export. The price reduction would be directly related to the fraction of sales
that are exported.
61. Miethke, supra note 7, at 872.
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tax paid before the export stage, as occurs under a credit-method
VAT." (That exports would effectively be exempt from the BNRT
paid directly by the exporter does not mean that the effective
exemption would be reflected in differences in in-state and export
prices. That would depend on the kind of analysis presented above
for integrated exporters.) In short, the BNRT would burden
California exports, penalize small businesses that are not exempt, and
encourage vertical integration. As Bankman et al., states:
[F]irms exporting goods and services produced in California
will, to the extent that they purchase inputs from firms subject
to the tax, have a BNRT cost embedded in their production
process. As with the current RST, a firm's ability to pass this
cost on to its non-California consumers will be limited. This
illustrates a fundamental design flaw with the BNRT conceptapportionment (even single-factor sales apportionment) is not
an adequate substitute for the type of border tax adjustments
used in typical cross-border VAT designs.63
Some may note that the same phenomenon occurs under the
corporate income tax, to the extent that a sales factor is employed to
apportion the income of multi-state enterprises. But this is not
relevant, as a conceptual matter. It is not unreasonable to believe
that sales should be included in the formula used to apportion
corporate income, as one of the determinants of where income
originates. That proposition is equally true, whether the income of a
single vertically integrated firm or that of two or more unintegrated
firms is being apportioned. That this methodology results in less
income being apportioned to California in the former case than in the
latter would not have the same significance as in the case of the
BNRT, where the intent is to approximate the effects of a
destination-based VAT, not to attribute income to the state where it
originates.
B. Imports
The analysis of effects on imports is analogous to that of exports
in the above case of vertical integration. Because of sales-only
apportionment, sales in California by out-of-state vendors meeting
62. Thus, Cline is simply wrong when he states, "Subtraction of all input purchases...
eliminates... pyramiding (double taxation)." See Cline, supra note 41.
63. Bankman et al., supra note 6, at 1-2. The Appendix uses simple algebra to
demonstrate these points.
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the BNRT nexus requirements would create a liability for the BNRT
that other sales would not produce. Again, this suggests that, in
theory, formula apportionment would produce the same result as
BTAs. But, as with exports, theory may not always reflect reality.
Customized pricing could be made to reflect the BNRT liability
associated with sales to California. But, because the BNRT is not
calculated and applied to individual transactions, standardized pricing
would not do so. 6'
VI. Opportunities for Tax Planning
At least two types of tax planning would be possible under the
BNRT. There are presumably more.
Substitution of Independent Contractorsfor Employees. Whereas
payments to independent contractors are deductible expenses, wages
and salaries are not. Contrary to what some think, this difference
would not per se create an incentive for outsourcing to independent
contractors, if independent contractors were subject to the BNRT.
But the small business exemption can provide a significant incentive
to replace employees with independent contractors or to misclassify
employees as independent contractors, in order to reduce aggregate
tax payments. Outsourcing and misclassifying employees undermines
economic neutrality, revenues, and equity.
Imports. If an out-of-state seller either lacks economic nexus in
California or qualifies for the small business exemption, the BNRT
would not be collected on sales it makes into the state. Given the
relatively low nexus threshold based on economic presence in
California and the application of unitary principles in determining tax
liability, this may seem not to be an important problem-at least not
if the nexus standard passes legal scrutiny, an issue discussed in
Section VII below. But it may be possible to structure transactions in
which sales into California are channeled through unrelated out-ofstate intermediaries that have little net receipts. 66 This would not be
64. For a discussion of the interaction of the small-business exemption and formula
apportionment, see also Section VI infra.
65. It may be worthwhile to explain this point: If there was no small-business
exemption, so that all independent contractors were subject to the BNRT, the tax on
independent contractors would make up for the fact that payments to them are deductible.
The small-business exemption in the Commission's proposal eliminates this compensating
effect, creating an incentive for outsourcing and misclassification of employees as
independent contractors.
66. Indeed, California firms might be able to avail themselves of this ruse, by routing
sales through out-of-state intermediaries. Anti-abuse rules would be easier to apply than

764
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prevented by either the unitary business rules or arm's length pricing
rules. Perhaps it could be prevented by anti-abuse rules, but not
without devoting substantial amounts of scarce administrative
resources to it. In any event, outsourcing to small out-of-state
independent contractors would be encouraged and perfectly legal.

Moreover, depending on how the water's edge limitation is
interpreted, "offshoring" to foreign vendors that lack nexus could be
encouraged.67

VII. Legal Challenges
It is unclear how the BNRT would be treated as a matter of

constitutional and federal statutory law. If it is seen as a sales tax, the
economic nexus standard will likely be held to violate the rule,
announced in National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of
Illinois" and affirmed in Quill v. North Dakota,69 that out-of-state

vendors can be required to collect use tax only if they have a physical
presence in the state.7" If, on the other hand, it is seen as a business
activity tax, it would fall into judicial limbo, since the United States
Supreme Court has not clarified whether taxes other than sales taxes
are subject to the physical presence test of nexus.7

in the case of sales originating from out-of-state vendors, but not without difficulty. The
same problem seems to plague use of the sales factor in the corporate income tax.
67. Fred Keeley, Commissioner, An Undated Letter to Daniel Steinberg, President
pro Tempore of the California State Senate, available at http://www.assembly.ca.gov/
acs/newcomframeset.asp?committee=21. Commissioner Fred Keeley warns, "The use of a
water's edge approach, combined with the questionable ability of the state to impose the
BNRT on firms without a physical presence in California, would likely encourage
businesses to outsource to firms outside of the United States that are not subject to
taxation in California." Id. See also Miethke, supra note 7.
68. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ili., 386 U. S. 753 (1967).
69. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
70. Indeed, if the BNRT is seen to be a sales tax, it may not be possible to require
even out-of-state vendors with a physical presence in the state to collect the tax, if sales
are deemed to occur outside the state. After all, the Quill nexus rule applies to obligation
to collect the use tax, a separate levy that accompanies the sales tax.
71. For a carefully reasoned analysis of these issues, see FTB, NEXUS REPORT, supra
note 36, at 6-11. See also McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 34, at 1303-06 (discussing the
constitutionality of the economic presence test of nexus in the MGRT under Quill, but not
its consistency with Public Law 86-272). They conclude that the MGRT is not likely to be
classified as a sales tax to which the physical presence test applies; Walter Hellerstein and
John A. Swain reach essentially the same conclusion. Walter Hellerstein & John A.
Swain, "Classifying State and Local Taxes: Current Controversies," 54 STATE TAX NOTES
35, 42 (Oct, 5, 2009), reprintedin part in Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State
Taxation, 3rd ed. (Boston: Warren, Gorham, and Lamont, 1998, rev. 2009). Nellen
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If courts see the BNRT as a tax on net income, it may run afoul
of Public Law 86-272, which protects taxpayers from the requirement
to pay income tax if their only activity in the state is solicitation for
As the
sale of tangible property delivered from out-of-state.
California Franchise Tax Board ("FTB") has noted, "Because Public
Law 86-272 applies only to a 'net income tax,' the critical question is
whether the BNRT would be viewed a net income tax within the
meaning of the statute. ,72
While warning of the uncertainty of how courts would decide
these issues, the FTB concluded that: (1) the BNRT is a business
activity tax ("BAT"), rather than a sales tax; (2) "a factor presence
nexus standard. .. should pass constitutional muster"; and (3) the
strictures of Public Law 86-272 would likely not apply, because the
BNRT, which allows no deduction for payroll, is not a net income
tax.73 On the other hand, Commissioner Richard Pomp, himself a
respected authority on state and local tax law, has written:
If the Nevada consultant whose only contact with California
was that its customer was based in California were viewed as
having economic nexus with the State, so would I sitting in
Connecticut talking on the phone with a California client (and
of course billing by the word). So would any out-of-state
vendor that loaded its goods onto a California firm's trucks for
use back in California. So would exporters around the world
have economic nexus. This view of economic nexus would
everything we think we know about the
simply rewrite
74
concept.
As the FTB acknowledges, "The BNRT, if enacted, presents
some novel tax issues that undoubtedly will lead to court

concludes, "Because the BNRT is neither a sales tax or income tax, it is not subject to the
physical presence or PL 86-272 standards." Nellen Testimony, supra note 11.
72. FrB NExus REPORT, supra note 36, at 12.
73. Id. at 12-14. The FTB added with regard to the third conclusion, "However,
because the scope of Public Law 86-272 is a question of federal law, and there are no
federal authorities on the subject, it is hard to place a high degree of confidence in this
conclusion." Id. at 14.
74. Pomp, Wrong Direction, supra note 11, at 12. Pomp goes on to say regarding the
FTB analysis, which he describes as "very thoughtful" that "The FFB was not asked,
however, to apply that standard to the type of situations raised above. Itis one thing to
opine that a court would apply an economic nexus standard; it is quite another to opine on
how that standard would apply to particular fact problems." Id.
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challenges. 7 ' The BNRT may be able to pass unscathed between the

Charybdis and Scylla represented by the legal standards described
above. But litigation that would settle the matter could take a long
time-upwards to a decade or more. In the meantime, there would

be an unacceptable amount of uncertainty for both the state fisc and

taxpayers.76 By adopting the BNRT, the state would expose itself to

the risk of having to refund enormous amounts of money to out-ofstate vendors.77
Moreover, legislation pending in the United States Congress
could impose on taxes such as the BNRT a nexus standard based on

the taxpayer's having a physical presence in the state. Enactment of
this legislation would undermine both the revenue potential and
economic neutrality of the BNRT.78 Although the ultimate fate of
this legislation cannot be predicted, it seems ill-advised for California
to undertake now, in the shadow of pending legislation, the
wrenching adjustments implied by the BNRT.79

75. FTB NEXUs REPORT, supra note 36, at 14. See also McIntyre & Pomp, supra
note 34, at 1305 (stating in regard to the Michigan analog to the BNRT, "Whatever the
merits of its position, Michigan can expect litigation over its use of an economic-presence
test.").
76. McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 34, at 1306. McIntyre and Pomp appear to take a
more sanguine view in stating: "Certainly, the threat of litigation should not deter a state
from adopting a rule that it considers to be both constitutional and significant. Otherwise,
all contentious legal issues would be decided by default in favor of the taxpayer." While
this view may be appropriate when limited to specific issues such as the use of the
economic presence test of nexus, the proviso stated in the last four words of the first
sentence should be amended in the case of fundamental reforms such as the BNRT to
require that the proposal also be sensible-a test the BNRT fails.
77. While acknowledging that the Supreme Court may "ultimately repudiate Quill, or
at least distinguish it for taxes other than the retail sales tax," Stark warns:
[A]t this point there is little evidence to support that position. Just to be clear, I
have no problem with the state challenging the scope of Quill. However, if the
question is whether we should fundamentally restructure the state tax system
based on a prediction of how the Supreme Court will decide some future nexus
case, I would err on the side of caution.
Stark Testimony, supra note 11.
78. H.R. 1083, 111th Cong. (2010). If enacted, H.R. 1083 would also restrict the
assertion of nexus for the corporate income tax. But it would not affect either the
individual income tax or the RST, revenues from which the BNRT would replace.
Business Activity Tax Simplification Act, H.R. 1083, 111th Cong. (2009).
79. Thus, Nellen warns, "Given the likelihood that P.L. 86-272 will be updated in the
near future, the BNT is a riskier proposition if it cannot be imposed on businesses with
very limited physical presence in the state." Nellen Testimony, supra note 11. The FI'B
NExus REPORT also observes that the US Congress could require a physical presence for
taxable nexus under a BAT. FTB NEXUs REPORT, supra note 36, at 10, fn. 50. Since any
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VIII. The Illegality of the BNRT Under
International Trade Rules
The rules governing international trade, primarily the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM"), provide that
border tax adjustments are allowed for indirect but not direct taxes.
The ASCM states this explicitly in regards to exports by describing
BTAs for direct taxes as a prohibited export subsidy. Annex I to the
ASCM, entitled "Illustrative List of Export Subsidies," includes the
following (with footnote 58 numbered here as in the original): "e)
The full or partial exemption remission, or deferral specifically
related to exports, of direct taxes 8 or social welfare charges paid or
payable by industrial or commercial enterprises." Footnote 58 of
ASCM Annex I, states: "The term 'direct taxes' shall mean taxes on
wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms of
income, and taxes on the ownership of real property."
As noted earlier, the BNRT is a tax on wages and profits and
thus could be seen as a direct tax under this definition. Since, as
noted in Section V above, sales-only apportionment is tantamount to
providing a tax exemption related to exports, despite its deficiencies
in that regard, described earlier, the BNRT treatment of exports
arguably violates the ASCM.
The GATT does not similarly state unequivocally that BTAs on
imports for direct taxes are forbidden. Rather, this must be inferred
from statements regarding the types of taxes for which BTAs are
allowed. GATT Article 11.2(a) says that BTAs for imports are
allowed for: "a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed.., in
respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an article from
which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in
whole or in part." Since direct taxes are not levied on products, the
references to taxation of products-and the lack of any reference to
direct taxes- implies that, as with exports, BTAs on imports are not
allowed for direct taxes.
This view is confirmed by the conclusions of the 1970 Working
Group on Border Tax Adjustments:
14.... The Working Party concluded that there was
convergence of views to the effect that taxes directly levied on

such legislation is unlikely to have retroactive effect, it would not imply refunds of taxes
collected previously. But the state could be left scrambling for future revenue.
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products were eligible for tax adjustment. Examples of such
taxes comprised specific excise duties, sales taxes and cascade
taxes and the tax on value added.... Furthermore, the
Working Party concluded that there was convergence of views
to the effect that certain taxes that were not directly levied on
products were not eligible for tax adjustment. ° (emphasis
added)
Since the BNRT is not levied on products, providing BTAs on

imports, which sales-only apportionment in effect does, arguably also
violates the GAT'.

The legality of state taxes under international trade rules is
probably not something most legislators and governors worry about.
They may not even know that there is an issue. However, an eminent
American authority on the GATT has observed, "Article XXIV:12

obligates

the United

States

to

compel

state

adherence

to

[GATT] ... ."' That article provides: "Each contracting party shall

take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure
observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and
local governments and authorities within its territories."
The trading partners of the United States may not notice that the
BNRT, if enacted, would violate the rules, complain about it if they

do notice, or be able to convince the federal government to enforce
their complaints.8 That does not change the fact that the BNRT
would arguably contravene those rules.

IX. Could the BNRT Be Fixed?
Given the defects of the BNRT, it is reasonably to ask whetherand how-it could be fixed to avoid the problems identified here.

80. BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS, report of the Working Party adopted on 2
December 1970, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.
pdf. It should be noted that, while the concept of a subtraction-method VAT was known
in 1970, the credit-method VAT (imposed by the Brazilian states and the members of the
European Common Market), was the only one that actually existed in practice and was
presumably what was meant be the reference to "the tax on value added."
81. Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GA TT in the Domestic Law of the United
States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 187, 221 (Meinhard Hilf, Francis G.

Jacobs, and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., Boston: Kluwer 1986).
82. Foreign governments seem not to have taken notice of the fact that sales-only
apportionment of state corporate income taxes, also a form of direct taxation, violates the
rules, despite the publication of Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Walter Hellerstein, Does Salesonly Apportionment of CorporateIncome Violate International Trade Rules?, 25 STATE
TAX NOTES NO. 11, 1315, 1318-19 (Sept. 9,2002).
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The Small-Business Exemption. The small business exemption is
a seemingly reasonable-if not well-reasoned-response to the desire
to free small business of the obligation to comply with the BNRT.
Unfortunately, it would create a gaping loophole through which
outsourcing to small independent contractors (including out-of-state
ones) and misclassification of employees as independent contractors
could easily pass. The result would be revenue loss and economic
inefficiency.' 3
Reducing the upper limit on availability of the small business
exemption would alleviate these problems, but impose an
unreasonable compliance burden on thousands of small businesses
and stretch the resources of tax administration. In principle, a more
appropriate solution, which would dampen the incentive to seek
exemptions that is inherent in the naive subtraction-method VAT,
would be to allow deductions only for purchases made from entities
subject to the BNRT. ' To the extent that a small-business credit
leads to outsourcing and misclassification of employees, this
restriction would not solve the problem. This solution, which would
resemble in spirit the availability of tax credits only for VAT shown
on purchase invoices under the credit method, would also entail
compliance and administrative burdens. But only entities that are
registered for the BNRT would experience the compliance burdens.
The real problem with this solution, however, as noted by Professor
Kirk Stark in his October 2009 testimony before the California
Committee on Revenue and Taxation,85 is that, no matter what its
justification as a matter of economic principle, it would raise serious,
if not insuperable constitutional objections by granting a tax
deduction only for entities engaged in in-state activity (and therefore
subject to the BNRT) but not for entities not engaged in in-state
activity (and not subject to the BNRT).86
83. See supra Section VI.
84. See MCLURE, supra note 47; Grinberg, supra note 47; and Weisbach, supra note
52, for discussions of a "sophisticated" subtraction-method VAT.
85. Stark Testimony, supra, note 11.
86. See Farmer Bros. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 108 Cal. App. 4th 976, 986-87 (2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1178 (2004); Ceridian Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 85 Cal. App. 4th 875,
883 (2000). In both of these cases, the California Court of Appeal invalidated a dividendsreceived deduction that was limited to dividends received from payors that were subject to
tax in California. As the court declared in FarmerBrothers:
[Slection 24402 is discriminatory on its face because it affords to taxpayers a
deductions for dividends received from corporations subject to tax in California,
while no deduction is afforded for dividends received from corporations not
subject to tax in California. As a result, the dividends received deduction scheme
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As indicated in Section V.A

above, sales-based formula apportionment is not a satisfactory
substitute for export BTAs. There seems to be no satisfactory
solution to this problem,"7 short of implementing BTAs, which should

not be contemplated absent a federal VAT-in which case the BNRT
would make even less sense.
Legal Issues. Given that the United States Supreme Court has
never stated clearly whether the Quill physical presence test of nexus

applies to taxes other than sales taxes-and has declined invitations
to do so-uncertainty regarding the application of this test to the
economic presence test of nexus for the BNRT is inevitable, as is
uncertainty regarding the applicability of Public Law 86-272. 8 Of
course, eliminating this test would avoid that, but that solution would
truly be to throw the baby out with the bath water.
GATT Legality. It appears that sales-based apportionment of

the BNRT may violate international trade rules and that this defect is
inherent in the system proposed.89 But it is uncertain whether foreign
governments would complain and whether the federal government
would respond positively to such a complaint. This risk of a
successful GATT challenge seems low.
Perceptions. In addition to the technical issues just examined,

there are the much more important problems of perception and the
associated political opposition to the BNRT. There is no easy way to
eliminate them.

Summary. There seem to be no easy fixes for the three most
important defects of the BNRT: the problems caused by the small
favors dividend-paying corporations doing business in California and paying
California taxes over dividend-paying corporations which do not do business in
California and pay no taxes in California. The deduction thus discriminates
between transactions on the basis of an interstate element, which is facially
discriminatory under the commerce clause.
Id. at 986-87.
It appears that a credit-method VAT would not suffer from the same infirmity. Business
purchasers registered for the VAT would be allowed credit for tax they had paid. In this
regard, in-state and out-of-state taxpayers would be treated equally.
87. The theoretically sound solution mentioned by McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 34,
at 1298, allowing pre-export vendors to treat part of their sales to exporters as exports, is
obviously unworkable. Even if an exporter's supplier could obtain the information
needed to implement this adjustment, its suppliers (and suppliers of its suppliers further
back in the production-distribution chain) could not easily obtain the required
information. As these authors admit, "The obvious problem with the fix is that it presents
serious administrative problems." Id.
88. See supra Section VII.
89. See supra Section VIIL
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business exemption, the multiple taxation of exports, and perception
problems. In addition, the uncertainty of the legality of the BNRT
under both the United States Constitution and federal statutory law
should give anyone considering the tax pause.
X. The Political Instability of Michigan's 'Value-Added Taxes'
Michigan recently began to levy the MGRT, a tax that resembles
the BNRT in many respects. 90 Experience with that tax is too new to
draw conclusions. It is worth noting, however, that this is the third
value-added tax Michigan has enacted since 1953, when it introduced
the Business Activity Tax ("BAT"), an apportioned subtractionmethod VAT tax that was repealed in 1967 and replaced with a
corporate income tax. Less than 10 years later, in 1976, Michigan
backtracked and introduced the SBT, an apportioned additionmethod VAT that was repealed in 2007 and replaced in part by the
MGRT, another subtraction-method VAT. 91 During the two periods
that the BAT and the SBT were in place, totaling almost 50 years,
Michigan tinkered incessantly with the two taxes, apparently in an
effort to "get it right"-or simply to satisfy the political demands of
various constituents.9 2
California might not repeat the instability of Michigan's tax
system: subtraction-method VAT, replaced by a corporate income
tax, followed by an addition-method VAT, and then a subtractionmethod VAT. But it would be wise to consider why Michigan's
system has exhibited so much instability, and whether a state VAT
implemented using either the addition- or subtraction-method VAT,
which share many faults, is a good idea. 93
Even if the BNRT were to be enacted and left in place,
uncertainty would exist. Sheffrin has stated the problem well:
I believe the novelty of the BNRT and the expected, but
unknown, difficulties that will arise in its implementation,
would initiate a long period of instability in California's system

90.

See generally,McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 34.
HOUSE
FISCAL AGENCY,
STATE
OF MICHIGAN HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES, MICHIGAN'S SINGLE BUSINESS TAX, supra note 53, at 4-6; see also

91. See

McIntyre and Pomp, supra note 33, at 1275-82.
92. McIntyre & Pomp, supranote 34, at 1283-90.
93. Observation on Income, Sales and Consumption Taxes before the Commission on
the 21st Century Economy (Feb. 12, 2009) (testimony of James R. Hines Jr.), available at

http://www.cotce.ca.gov/meetings/2009/2-12/testimony/.
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of taxation. There is much to be said in favor of the maxim,
that an "old tax is a good tax." Moving away from familiar
taxes whose parameters have been established through
litigation, such as the corporation tax and the state sales tax, to
a new and untested tax will create additional uncertainty for
firms and increased lobbying and rent-seeking on the part of
special interests.
The Commission's recommendation for
including a Research and Development credit-despite
virtually no evidence on its efficacy-and possibly even
allowing deductions for employee health insurance-previews
the types of interventions we would expect. I would also expect
strong pressure from groups representing labor to push for
deductibility of some forms of employee compensation,
particularly if outsourcing becomes an important consideration.
As a result of the inevitable changes that will be enacted to the
tax, firms considering investing in California will not be able to
count on a stable framework. This additional uncertainty can
easily act as a punitive "tax" on doing business in California. 4

XI. Is There a Better Alternative?
Until recently it was thought that subnational governments could
not implement VATs, because of the difficulty of implementing
BTAs.95 Quebec, however, has demonstrated that a provincial creditmethod VAT is possible. 96 But it does so in the context of a federal
VAT. In the absence of a federal VAT, the conventional wisdom
remains intact. However, if the federal government were to enact a
VAT, California could take the opportunity either to adopt a state

94. Sheffrin Testimony, supra note 11, at 3.
95. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Implementing State and Local Sales Taxes in the
Context of a Federal VA T, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 102ND ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE
NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION, (forthcoming); Charles E. McLure, Jr., How to
Coordinate State and Local Sales Taxes with a Federal Value Added Tax, 63 TAx L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010), (presented at a conference sponsored by the American Tax Policy
Institute on "Structuring a Federal VAT: Design & Coordination Issues," Washington,
Feb. 18-19, 2009, availableat http://www.americantaxpolicyinstitute.org/research.html).
96. Richard M. Bird & Pierre-Pascal Gendron, Dual VATs and Cross-BorderTrade:
Two ProblemsOne Solution?, 5 INT'L TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE 429 (Jul. 1998); Richard
M. Bird & Pierre-Pascal Gendron, Sales Taxes in Canada: The GST-HST-QST-RST
'System,' 63 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), (presented at a conference sponsored by the
American Tax Policy Institute on "Structuring a Federal VAT: Design & Coordination
Issues," Washington, Feb. 18-19, 2009, availableat http://www.americantaxpolicyinstitute.
org/research.html).
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VAT or to vastly improve its sales tax, by coordinating it with the
federal tax. 7
It is understandable that the Commission could not recommend
coordinating the state sales tax or a newly enacted credit-method
VAT with a non-existent federal VAT. But, as noted by Bankman et
al., given the defects of the BNRT, many of which have been
described here, it would have been better for the Commission to
propose improvements to the existing RST, rather than proposing the
BNRT. That would not have been "bold," but it would have been
prudent.
Conclusion
Not only does the BNRT exhibit the well-known defects of a
subtraction method VAT; sales-only apportionment would not
actually achieve the desired effects of destination-based taxation in
many important cases. If enacted, the BNRT is likely to be subject to
both tax planning (including the substitution of independent
contractors for employees and reclassification of employees as
independent contractors) and legal challenges, and to be unpopular
with California business and labor. It is, in short, a dog-a dog that
will not hunt; it should not be seriously considered, much less
adopted. As Professor Stark noted last October in his testimony
before the Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation, adoption
of the Commission's proposals would be "a major step backwards for
the state of California." 98

97. See McLure, Jr., How to CoordinateState and Local Sales Taxes with a Federal
Value Added Tax, supra note 95; McLure, Jr., Implementing State and Local Sales Taxes in
the Context of a Federal VAT, supra note 95.
98. Stark Testimony, supra note 11.
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Appendix
Demonstration That Apportionment Does Not Always Relieve Exports
of BNRT
Under the standard credit-method VAT, exports occur tax-free.
This is not the case under the BNRT.
Consider two scenarios: A) an "unintegrated" two-stage
production/distribution process in which California firm 1 sells all its
output to California firm 2, and B) an integrated process in which a
single firm I combines the activities carried out by firms 1 and 2.
Assume for the sake of simplicity that sales that enter the sales factor
in the apportionment formula and gross receipts that enter the
calculation of net receipts are the same.
The BNRT tax bases of firms 1 and 2 in the first ("unintegrated")
scenario would be:
N, = (S. - P,) Sc,/Sl and(l)
N2 = (S2 - P 2) Sc/$ 2,: (2)
where N, S, P, and Sc , with the appropriate subscripts. describe the
two firms' apportioned net receipts, sales, purchases, and sales in
California.
Since firm 1 sells all its output to firm 2, S, = S, and P 2 = S,. The
two equations can thus be rewritten as:
N, = (S, - P1 ) and (la)
N 2 = (S2 - S 1) SS2'S
(2a)
.

The total BNRT tax base of the two firms can be written as:
N1 + N2

=

(S

1

-

P 1)

+ (S 2 - S 1 ) SC2/82"

(3)

Because of the way the example is constructed, the sales and
apportionment factor of the integrated firm are the same as those of
firm 2 and its purchases are the same as those of firm 1. Thus its
BNRT tax base would be:
N, = (S 2 - P.) SJS 2.(4)
That the aggregate tax base of the two unintegrated firms will
generally exceed that of the integrated firm can be seen by
subtracting equation (4) from equation (3):
AN=Nl+N 2 - N. = (SI- P,) + [(S 2 - S) SJ2] - (S2 - P) SCS 2. (5)
After some algebraic manipulation, this can be rewritten as;
AN = (S, - P,) (1 - SjS 2).(5a)

Assuming that S, - P, is positive (i.e., that firm 1 has positive net
receipts), this difference is zero if and only if Sc2 = S2, that is, if and
only if firm 2 makes all its sales in California. If, on the other hand,
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firm 2 exports all its output, so that SJS 2 = 0, this difference equals
the net receipts of firm 1. That is, the portion of firm 2's exports
equal to the value added of firm 1 is subject to double taxation. More
generally, to the extent that firm 2 exports its product, apportionment
does not fully compensate for NBRT paid before the export stage. If
products pass through more stages in California before being
exported, the BNRT paid on value added at those earlier stages is
also not relieved from tax.
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